Abstract. Game contingent claims (GCCs) generalize American contingent claims by allowing the writer to recall the option as long as it is not exercised, at the price of paying some penalty. In incomplete markets, an appealing approach is to analyze GCCs like their European and American counterparts by solving option holder's and writer's optimal investment problems in the underlying securities. By this, partial hedging opportunities are taken into account. We extend results in the literature by solving the stochastic game corresponding to GCCs with both continuous time stopping and trading. Namely, we construct Nash equilibria by rewriting the game as a non-zero-sum stopping game in which players compare payoffs in terms of their exponential utility indifference values. As a by-product, we also obtain an existence result for the optimal exercise time of an American claim under utility indifference valuation by relating it to the corresponding nonlinear Snell envelope.
Introduction
A game contingent claim (GCC) as introduced in Kifer [25] , is a contract between a buyer/holder and a seller/writer which can be exercised by the buyer and recalled by the seller at any time up to a maturity date when the contract is terminated anyway. The contract can be modeled by two stochastic processes (X t A standing assumption is X ≤ Y , meaning that stopping is penalized. In the last two decades, such contracts have been extensively studied in the literature. We refer to Kifer [26] for a recent review. The starting point was the article by Kifer [25] who showed that in a complete market, the option has a unique no-arbitrage price and can be perfectly hedged by the writer. Here, a hedge consists of a dynamic trading strategy in the underlyings and a recalling time. In incomplete markets, however, perfect hedges may fail to exist and there are essentially three different approaches generalizing [25] . First there is super-hedging (see, e.g., Section 13.2.1 of [19] ), which has the drawback that it is often too expensive and in many situations only leads to trivial bounds for arbitrage-free prices. Another approach consists in considering GCCs as liquid securities which can be dynamically traded simultaneously with the underlyings, with the only difference that their prices are not exogenously given. The exercise and recall features of a GCC are implicitly modeled by short selling and long buying constraints, respectively. It turns out that both a no-arbitrage criterion and a utility maximization criterion for a representative investor lead to the dynamic value of a zero-sum stopping game as a price process for a GCC. In the first case, expectations are taken under an arbitrary martingale measure and in the second under the martingale measure induced by the marginal utility at the optimal terminal wealth when only trading in the underlyings is possible (see [19] and [18] , respectively).
In the present article, we follow the third approach which is in the spirit of utility-based hedging of European claims as introduced by Hodges and Neuberger [16] , see the survey article Becherer [4] and the references therein. For an analysis of the utility-based hedging problem for American contingent claims, we refer to Leung and Sircar [28] and Leung et al. [29] . Here, we consider as in [27] a game between the buyer and the seller of a GCC who both aim to maximize their expected utility from terminal wealth by exercising/recalling the GCC and trading, in addition, arbitrary amounts in the underlyings. This means that as in [25] , but in contrast to [18] and [19] , the GCC is no liquid asset. Applied to the special case of a complete market, the game leads to the same stopping times as in [25] , i.e., the buyer tries to maximize, whereas the seller tries to minimize the expected option's payoff under the unique equivalent martingale measure. Especially, this means that the equilibrium stopping times do not depend on agents' preferences, and equilibrium values are unique. In [27] , it is furthermore shown that Nash equilibria exist also in a general incomplete market if the utility functions are exponential, i.e., the absolute risk aversion does not depend on wealth. However, while trading in the underlying is continuous, stopping the contract is only discrete in [27] . This allows to construct equilibrium stopping regions by a backward recursion in time. Later on, in the seminal paper of Hamadène and Zhang [14] , equilibria of non-zero-sum continuous time stopping games have been derived under minimal conditions on the payoff processes. This can be applied to the above game for arbitrary utility functions of the holder and the writer, but only in the special case that they do not have access to a financial market, i.e., (partial) hedging opportunities are not taken into account (see Section 4 of [14] ). Since the utility functions are typically nonlinear, it is a non-zero-sum game and equilibria are in general not unique.
An observation in [27] is that Nash equilibrium points may fail to exist for players' utility functions other than exponential. Namely, by the non-constancy of the absolute risk aversion, equilibria cannot be constructed backwards in time since the past trading gains in the underlyings matter (cf. Remarks 2.4 and 2.5 therein for a counterexample and a detailed explanation, respectively). This also shows that the result of [14] , which is not restricted to exponential utility, cannot be applied to the problem if there are (partial) hedging opportunities. In the current article, we close the above mentioned gap and extend [27] for exponential utility functions to continuous time stopping (see Theorem 2.3). For this, we combine the techniques of derivation of the above mentioned result of [14] , who consider games under linear expectations, with new results on optimal stopping when payoffs are valued by utility indifference that is in general nonlinear in the payoff. We note that the results of [14] have recently been partly extended by Grigorova and Quenez [13] to a non-zero-sum game with players evaluating their payoffs in terms of (nonlinear) g-expectations for Lipschitz generator functions g. However, although in a continuous time setup, the latter article restricts the equilibrium analysis of the game to discrete time stopping strategies. Furthermore since the dynamic exponential indifference valuation typically is a g-expectation with g of quadratic growth (cf. e.g. Theorem 13 in Mania and Schweizer [30] ), the results of [13] are not directly applicable to our non-zero-sum game.
Given a recalling time of the option writer, for an exponential utility function, the utility maximization and timely exercise problem of the option holder can be reduced to an optimal stopping problem in which the random payoff of the American claim is not evaluated by its (linear) expectation, but by its (buyer's) indifference price that is not homogeneous. This means that one has to solve sup τ π 0 (L τ ), where L is the payoff process, π 0 is the initial indifference valuation, and τ runs through all [0, T ]-valued stopping times the holder can choose. Let π t be the conditional indifference valuation at time t. By the time-consistency of the indifference valuation operator π = (π t ) t∈[0,T ] , it seems to be self-evident that there should be a smallest "π-supermartingale" that dominates L and, if L has no negative jumps, the optimal stopping time is given by the first time this supermartingale hits L. However, in continuous time, it seems very difficult to provide rigorous proofs to this conjecture. Our result on optimal stopping under indifference valuation is Theorem 3.5, which characterizes the optimal exercise time of an American claim as the first time the payoff process hits the corresponding nonlinear Snell envelope associated to the American exponential utility indifference value. To the best of our knowledge this is a new result, and it is also of independent interest. For its proof, we extend properties of the dynamic European indifference valuation derived by Mania and Schweizer [30] to the American one and establish a reverse continuity result (Proposition 3.2) for the indifference valuation. Before describing this proof in more details, let us discuss the relation to existing contributions on optimal stopping with nonlinear expectations.
Beyond the classical theory of optimal stopping under linear expectations surveyed in the seminal article El Karoui [9] , the theory of optimal stopping under nonlinear expectation is in general also quite well-developed. Studies in the latter direction have mostly concentrated on sublinear expectations that are positively homogeneous, and hence can as well be associated to dynamic coherent risk measures; cf. among others [22, 32, 8, 31] . But these do not include the European utility indifference valuation, which in general is neither subadditive nor positively homogeneous. The closest article to our work on the American indifference value is Bayraktar et al. [1] , which solves the problem of optimal stopping under convex risk measures in a Brownian filtration setting. By making use of a representation of convex risky measures from Delbaen et al. [7] , they consider risk measures that can be written as a worst case expectation of the payoff plus a proper convex penalty function in which the Girsanov kernels of equivalent probability measures are plugged. By this representation, which in turn relies on the predictable representation property of Brownian martingales as stochastic integrals, the problem can be solved by similar methods as for problems of robust (worst-case) combined stochastic control and optimal stopping, see, e.g., Karatzas and Zamfirescu [23] . In one aspect, our assumptions are slightly weaker than those of [1] since we only assume that the filtration is continuous instead of Brownian. But, more importantly, our methods are completely different from theirs. In [28] , it is already stated that the optimal exercise time of an American claim is given by the first time the nonlinear Snell envelope hits the payoff process. We think that Proposition 2.13 therein holds true, but we do not think that in its proof, Theorem 2.10 from Karatzas and Zamfirescu [22] , which deals with a best case optimal stopping problem that is positively homogeneous in the payoff, can be applied. On the other hand, Bayraktar and Yao [2, 3] solve the optimal stopping problem for convex expectations by arguing with an up-crossing theorem for nonlinear expectations. Since the buyer's indifference value is concave in the random payoff, we cannot apply their results. Recently, Grigorova et al. [12] have obtained results on optimal stopping under g-expectations for Lipschitz generators g and for payoff processes only required to be optional (rather than càdlàg) with respect to a usual filtration generated by a Brownian motion and an independent Poisson random measure. We also cannot apply their results because the indifference valuation corresponds to a g-expectation with g of quadratic growth.
We establish in Theorem 3.5 the existence of a right-continuous "Snell envelope" corresponding to the American exponential utility indifference valuation. Crucial for the proof is both a continuity result from [30] (cf. property 7 in Proposition 3.1) and its reverse, which we newly derive in the present article, cf. Proposition 3.2. The arguments in the proof of Theorem 3.5 do not use an up-crossing theorem and hence could also be applied to more general nonlinear expectations. Recall that the classical up-crossing theorem states that every supermartingale (under a linear expectation) admits finite left and right limits over rationals (cf. e.g. Proposition 3.14 (i) in Chapter 1 of Karatzas and Shreve [20] ). Our techniques are similar to the ones in the classical theory of optimal stopping under linear expectations with càdlàg payoff processes and filtrations satisfying the usual conditions (see e.g. Appendix D of Karatzas and Shreve [21] ). But, since we do not rely on the up-crossing theorem, that guarantees the existence of a right-limit process, we argue with a right-liminf process of the Snell envelope values at rational time points. It is not a priori clear that this process is right-continuous, so a critical part of our analysis is dedicated to verify this. First, we show that the process is progressively measurable and right continuous along stopping times. Then, an optional projection argument combined with the section theorem yields right-continuity up to evanescence. Our arguments rely on the continuity of the filtration at two places: first to identify (through the reverse continuity of the indifference operator, Proposition 3.2) the optimal stopping time as the first time the payoff process meets the Snell envelope, and second to show that the defined right-liminf process is right-continuous along stopping times relying on the fact that every stopping time is predictable.
For supermartingales under nonlinear expectations, the up-crossing theorem holds if the (nonlinear) expectation of a sequence of non-negative random variables explodes when the sequence tends pointwise to infinity on a set with positive probability (cf. hypothesis (H0) in [2] and its use in the proof of the nonlinear up-crossing Theorem 2.3 therein). For a European claim, the buyer's indifference value is a submartingale under the entropy minimizing martingale measure (EMMM) and thus the usual up-crossing theorem guarantees a càdlàg version (see Proposition 12 in [30] and also Theorem 3 in Bion-Nadal [5] ). For an American claim this is more delicate, as the price can decrease if the optimal execution time is missed. Indeed, in general, the American indifference price is neither a sub-nor a supermartingale under the EMMM. In addition, although the American indifference price satisfies the supermartingale property with respect to the family of indifference valuation operators (π t ) t∈[0,T ] , the nonlinear expectation π 0 (·) violates hypothesis (H0) of [2] (see Note 3.3 for a counterexample), hence hindering a straightforward application of the (nonlinear) up-crossing theorem. However, though right continuity of the American indifference value is sufficient for our purpose in the proof of existence of a Nash equilibrium point for the GCC in Theorem 2.3, we complement Theorem 3.5 by showing in Remark 3.6 that the American indifference value is indeed càdlàg. This is achieved by writing the latter as a continuous function of the quotient of two supermartingales to which the up-crossing theorem for linear expectations can be applied.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we specify the mathematical framework and state the main result, Theorem 2.3, about the existence of Nash equilibria. By relating the problem to utility-indifference valuation, Section 3 prepares the proof of Theorem 2.3 which is then completed in Section 4. Plus, Section 3 states the key Theorem 3.5 on optimal stopping under utility indifference valuation. Finally the appendix Section 5 gathers proofs of results that are omitted throughout the main text.
Problem formulation and main result
We start with a filtered probability space (Ω, F, F = (F t ) t∈[0,T ] , P ) with time horizon T ∈ R + and a filtration F satisfying the usual conditions of right-continuity and completeness. For a [0, T ]-valued stopping time τ , we denote by T τ the family of stopping times σ such that τ ≤ σ ≤ T P -almost-surely. We denote by Z Q the density process of an equivalent measure Q with respect to P and by E Q τ [·] the conditional expectation under Q given the information F τ up to a stopping time τ ∈ T 0 . In particular for Q = P , we simply write
. If not stated otherwise, inequalities between random variables are understood in the P -almost-surely sense. For a generic σ-algebra A and a probability measure Q, we denote by L ∞ (A, Q) the space of A-measurable random variables that are Q-essentially bounded and by S ∞ (Q) the space of F-adapted processes Y with càdlàg paths satisfying
We consider a general, possibly incomplete, financial market consisting of d underlying risky assets with discounted price process S = (S i ) i=1,...,d being a semimartingale, and a riskless asset with unit discounted price. Throughout, we assume that the risky asset price process
S is locally bounded (for the main result of the article, it has to be even continuous). Denoting M e := M e (S, P ) the set of equivalent local martingale measures for S, we assume there exists at least one element Q of M e that has finite entropy E Z Q T log Z Q T with respect to P in the sense that
In particular, there exists a unique measure Q E ∈ M e f , the so-called entropy minimizing martingale measure (EMMM), that satisfies
cf. Theorem 2.1 in Frittelli [10] , which beyond boundedness of S also extends to locally bounded S. We denote by L(S) the space of F-predictable S-integrable R d -valued processes. For ϑ ∈ L(S), the stochastic integral of ϑ with respect to S is denoted · 0 ϑ tr s dS s . We work as in [30] with a space of admissible trading strategies
f . Note that such admissible trading strategies clearly exclude arbitrage opportunities.
Consider two agents, A and B, who are the seller and buyer of a GCC, respectively. We assume that A and B in addition to entering the contract, have access to the financial market. The agents' preferences are modeled by exponential utility functions U A , U B , with constant absolute risk-aversion parameters α A , α B > 0, i.e., U A (x) = − exp(−α A x) and U B (x) = − exp(−α B x), x ∈ R. Let X, Y ∈ S ∞ and define
the GCC payoff of agent B paid by agent A at time τ ∧ σ, when A and B choose stopping strategies σ and τ , respectively, for τ, σ ∈ T 0 . Agents A and B have exogenous endowments given by the contingent claims 
Similarly, the buyer of the contract wants to maximize her expected utility from terminal wealth
Definition 2.1. We say that a pair (τ * , σ * ) ∈ T 0 × T 0 is a Nash equilibrium point (NEP) for the non-zero-sum game associated to (2.6)/(2.7) if
Remark 2.2. Alternatively, one may model the problem as a so-called extensive game in which players' decisions are sequential, and each player makes a decision depending on the "nature" (given by the filtration) and the past actions of her counter-party. The sequential decisions consist, at each step, of stopping the contract or not, and choosing the amount of underlyings held in the portfolio. We refer to González-Díaz et al. [11] for an introduction to extensive games and related concepts. At least in finite discrete time and finite Ω, one can easily prove that a NEP in the sense of (2.8) induces a stochastic feedback Nash equilibrium in the extensive game described above. Namely, given a NEP (2.8), one takes τ * , σ * together with the investment strategies which attain the suprema (2.6)/(2.7) for τ = τ * and σ = σ * , and consider them as feedback strategies where the response function is degenerated, i.e., each player simply ignores past actions of her counter-party. Only past actions of the nature are used because the quantities are in general stochastic. Note that given (τ * , σ * ), the suprema (2.6)/(2.7) can be determined separately since the investment strategy of one player has no effect on the wealth of the other player (trading has, e.g., no impact on the underlying's price). Since, in addition, the option's payoff cannot be influenced anymore after the first player stops the contract, and, consequently, τ * , σ * are stopping strategies that implicitly condition that the other player has not stopped yet, the "feedback" strategies constructed above with degenerated response functions are also optimal in the set of all feedback strategies with arbitrary response functions. Furthermore, the same holds a fortiori when looking at a variant of this extended game in which each player only observes the stopping time but not the investment strategy of the other player. Finally, since the NEPs are constructed backwards in time (see the construction (2.3)-(2.7) in [27] for the special case that stopping is discrete), there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium. We leave it as an easy exercise for the reader to write down the finite extensive game and prove the above assertions (since the players may stop simultaneously, one has to work with a nontrivial information partition in Definition 3.1.1 of [11] ). Since the finite extensive game boils down to the game (2.6)/(2.7), for the continuous time modeling, we prefer to start directly with (2.6)/(2.7).
The main result of the article is the following theorem, and the proof is deferred to Section 4.
the filtration F is continuous,
i.e., any local F-martingale is a.s. continuous, and the payoff processes satisfy Then, the non-zero-sum game associated to u A , u B given in (2.6)/(2.7) with α A , α B ∈ (0, ∞),
Remark 2.4. The difference Y − X ≥ 0 can be interpreted as the penalty the writer of the GCC has to pay if recalling the option before it is exercised. Consequently, there is a negative attitude towards stopping as for both players it appears more advantageous that her counter-party terminates the game in her stead. Condition (2.11) guarantees that optimal stopping times are attained, and we need not deal with almost optimal stopping times.
Indifference value
In this section, we first state old and new facts on exponential utility indifference valuation. Then, we characterize a NEP in terms of indifference values for the payoffs (2.5). Finally, we characterize the optimal stopping time when payoffs are evaluated at their indifference prices. This prepares the proof of our main result Theorem 2.3 concerning existence of a NEP for the game (2.6)/(2.7), that we provide in Section 4.
The game problem (2.8) can be reformulated in terms of the utility indifference valuation of suitable claims, in a way that one obtains a non-zero-sum Dynkin game in which players evaluate payoffs directly by utility indifference. Before making this relation precise, we recall briefly the definition and some dynamic properties of the exponential indifference valuation for bounded claims. A relatively general study of this was performed by [30] in a setup analogous to the one of Section 2, with Θ corresponding exactly to the space Θ 2 of trading strategies in Delbaen et al. [6] , where other possible spaces of trading strategies are also compared. As we have adopted an analogous setup, we are able to use some results of [30] when the need arises.
Let H be a contingent claim in L ∞ (F T ) and consider an agent who is willing to buy the claim H at some time t ∈ [0, T ], and whose preferences are described by an exponential utility function U for some risk-aversion parameter α ∈ (0, ∞), i.e. U (x) = −e −αx , x ∈ R. In addition, the agent has the random endowment C ∈ L ∞ (F T ). The buyer's indifference value π α,C t (H) at time t ∈ [0, T ] is the amount that the agent needs to pay at time t to receive the claim H at terminal time T so that the agent's maximal expected utility from additionally trading between t and T with zero initial capital coincides with his maximal expected utility from solely trading with zero initial capital. In other words, π Under (2.1) and (2.2), Theorem 2.2 in [6] (whose condition (2.13) was shown by Kabanov and Stricker [17] to be unneeded) and a dynamic programming principle imply that the left-hand side of (3.1) almost surely does not vanish, and hence a direct reformulation of (3.1) yields
In general, the indifference value depends on the exogenous random endowment C, but by replacing the measure P by P C defined via dP C /dP := exp(−αC)/E[exp(−αC)], one can reduce it to the case without a random endowment. In particular Θ and M e f remain the same when changing from P to P C . By allowing for non-replicable C, one can model the impact of illiquid portfolio positions on the indifference value. Also note that 
In the following proposition, we state some dynamic properties of the exponential indifference value. 
where Q E,C is EMMM from (2.3) after replacing P by P C . (2) "(Strict) monotonicity": If
The proofs of these properties can be either found in Mania and Schweizer [30, Propositions 4, 12, 14, and 15] or are straightforward generalizations. Note that only the case C = 0 has to be considered, since the extension to general C ∈ L ∞ is straightforward by replacing P by P C . For the strict monotonicity in 2., one uses that the supremum in the numerator of (3.2) is attained, see
The following result can be seen as a reverse of part 7. above.
The result in Proposition 3.2 is new to the best of our knowledge, and constitutes a crucial ingredient in the proofs of both Theorem 3.5 and Lemma 4.5, needed for achieving our main result Theorem 2.3. We include the proof in appendix Section 5. In the sequel, we denote by
the exponential utility indifference valuation operators for agents A and B, respectively. In terms of indifference values, a NEP for the game (2.6)/(2.7) can be characterized as follows.
Proposition 3.4. Let X, Y ∈ S ∞ . A pair (τ * , σ * ) ∈ T 0 × T 0 is a NEP for the non-zero-sum game (2.6)/(2.7) if and only if for all τ, σ ∈ T 0 ,
Proof. First note that by (3.2), the indifference value for claim C ∈ L ∞ and risk-aversion parameter α ∈ (0, ∞) satisfies Hence one obtains the required equivalence by substituting (3.4) into (2.6)/(2.7) for risk-aversion parameters α A , α B , exogenous endowments C A , C B , and for claims R(τ * , σ * ), R(τ * , σ), R(τ, σ * ).
The game is typically of non-zero-sum type since under market incompleteness, the implication
does not hold in general, for
On the other hand, in a complete market, the indifference valuations of both players are the replication cost which yields (3.5).
The following theorem is key in the construction of a NEP in Theorem 2.3. It provides existence and uniqueness of a right-continuous adapted process that dominates a given payoff process and firstly hits it at an optimal stopping time. In addition, this unique process only depends on the future payoff process restricted to all events from which it is already known that they occur. These are the properties that are needed for dynamic programming, and it is natural to call the process the nonlinear Snell envelope with respect to the nonlinear expectation given by the European indifference valuation. The proof of the theorem is relegated to appendix Section 5.
Theorem 3.5 (Snell envelope and optimal stopping). Let F be continuous, α ∈ (0, ∞), C ∈ L ∞ , and let L be a payoff process in S ∞ . Then, there exists a right-continuous adapted process V with
The process V is unique up to evanescence (i.e., unique up to a global P -null set not depending on time) and possesses the following properties:
with Vτ t = Lτ t P -a.s. and π
Remark 3.6. In the proof of Theorem 3.5, the up-crossing theorem is not required. Thus, the arguments hold for quite general nonlinear expectations. However, for the American indifference value, which is in general neither a super-nor a submartingale (w.r.t. P or Q E ), we show in the following that the up-crossing theorem can nevertheless be used to prove that the dynamic value admits finite left and right limits over rationals. The indifference value can be written as
Let us show that A t := esssup (ϑ,τ )∈Θ×Tt E t − e (ϑ, τ ) ∈ Θ × T t+h is maximum-stable and thus
Since the denominator in the last line of (3.7) coincides with A t for L = 0, it also satisfies the supermartingale property. We conclude that there exists an event with full probability on which for all t ∈ R + the limits 
To prove the existence of a pair (τ * , σ * ) satisfying (4.1), we follow the ideas of Hamadène and Zhang [14] . But, to deal with the nonlinearity of the indifference valuation, we have to adjust the proof for linear expectations at various places, mainly by applying Proposition 3.2 and Theorem 3.5. To receive readability, we repeat the main proof of [14] while omitting only the parts which are one-to-one translations.
One first constructs optimal response strategies through two sequences of stopping times (τ 2n+1 ) n∈N0 , (τ 2n+2 ) n∈N0 for the buyer and the seller, resp., and shows that both sequences are nonincreasing. Finally, one shows that the limits τ * 1 of τ 2n+1 and τ * 2 of τ 2n+2 as n tends to infinity define a NEP (τ * 1 , τ * 2 ) = (τ * , σ * ) satisfying (4.1). Of course, the monotonicity of the sequences of stopping times is key, since otherwise the optimal response strategies may oscillate.
Let τ 1 := τ 2 := T . Given τ 2n−1 , τ 2n for some n ∈ N, we want to construct τ 2n+1 as follows: Consider the payoff process
Under (2.9), (2.10) and (2.11), Theorem 3.5 can be applied to L 2n+1 , and an optimal stopping time of
where the π B -Snell envelope V 2n+1 is the unique right-continuous adapted process satisfying
(the second equality in (4.3) follows from Theorem 3.5(iv)). Furthermore, we define (4.5) τ 2n+1 :=τ 2n+1 1 {τ2n+1<τ2n} + τ 2n−1 1 {τ2n+1=τ2n} .
Remark 4.1. The payoff process L 2n+1 is chosen to be càdlàg. This comes at the price that L 2n+1 τ differs from R(τ, τ 2n ) on the set {τ = τ 2n < T }. Thus, it is not yet clear thatτ 2n+1 is an optimal response strategy to τ 2n . In addition, one takes τ 2n+1 instead of τ 2n+1 . Yet, it is not even clear that τ 2n+1 is a stopping time, and, a fortiori, that it is also an optimal response strategy to τ 2n .
Given τ 2n , τ 2n+1 , the response τ 2n+2 of the seller A is defined in the same way by
with payoff process
and π A -Snell envelope V 2n+2 satisfying
Lemma 4.2. Assume (2.9), (2.10) and (2.11). Then (1) For any n ∈ N, τ n is a stopping time and τ n+2 ≤ τ n .
(2) On the event {τ n+1 = τ n }, n ∈ N, one has τ m = T for all m ≤ n.
Proof. The assertions are the same as in Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2 in [14] , and the proof is one-to-one. Only in (3.8) of [14] , the linear Snell envelope has to be replaced by the nonlinear Snell envelope from Theorem 3.5. Here, we need properties (iii) and, again, (ii) of Theorem 3.5.
The following lemma shows that τ 2n+1 , τ 2n+2 are indeed optimal responses. Though its proof is analogous to that of Lemma 3.3 in [14] , we provide it in the appendix Section 5 for the reader's convenience since adjustments are required at many places. Lemma 4.3. Assume (2.9), (2.10) and (2.11). Then for any τ ∈ T 0 and n ∈ N, it holds that
By the monotonicity from Lemma 4.2(i), the optimal response strategies possess pointwise limits
that are of course again stopping times. To prove that (τ * 1 , τ * 2 ) is a NEP, it only remains to show that the operations of taking limits and applying the indifference value operator can be interchanged. The latter is done in the following two lemmas, which are proven in the appendix Section 5, and used in the proof of Theorem 2.3 that we provide directly thereafter.
Lemma 4.4. Assume (2.9), (2.10) and (2.11). Then for any τ ∈ T 0 , it holds that
Lemma 4.5. Assume (2.9), (2.10) and (2.11). Then,
indeed is a NEP, it remains to show that (4.7) holds for arbitrary τ ∈ T 0 . To this end, let τ ∈ T 0 and define the sequence (τ n ) n∈N ⊂ T 0 bŷ
2 ) for all n ∈ N. Furthermoreτ n ↓ τ almost surely as n ↑ ∞. With the right-continuity of the bounded process t → R(τ * 1 , t) and the continuity of π
0 is a NEP and the proof is completed.
Appendix
This section contains the proofs of Proposition 3.2, Theorem 3.5, and Lemmata 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. Without loss of generality let C = 0. By Theorem 13 in Mania and Schweizer [30] and following the proof of Proposition 14 therein, we know that for any n ∈ N (5.1) π α,0
where Q E denotes the EMMM, and we refer to Kazamaki [24] for some essentials on BMO theory. In the proof of [24, Theorem 2.4], implication (a) =⇒ (b), the parameter p > 1 only has to satisfy
2), p can be chosen uniformly in n and one gets sup
where c p > 0 is a universal constant. Then, Hölder's inequality gives for all n ∈ N,
Since the RHS of (5.1) tends to 0, (5.3) implies that η n converges to 0 in Q E -probability. By Q E ∼ P , the assertion follows.
Proof of Theorem 3.5. For notational simplicity, we denote π := π α,C . For all s ∈ Q ∩ [0, T ], fix throughout the proof a version V s := esssup τ ∈Ts π s (L τ ) satisfying V s ≥ L s and for technical convenience set V t := L T for t > T . Define 
By the usual conditions,
V is obviously progressively measurable.
Step 1: One has
Indeed, π is time consistent, strictly monotone, continuous and by the local property of π s (·), the set {π s (L τ ) | τ ∈ T s } is maximum-stable. Consequently, the assertions follow one-to-one from the standard arguments for the linear expectation, see, e.g., Lemma D.1 and Proposition D.2 in [21] , where (D.3) is only evaluated at deterministic and rational-valued stopping times.
Step 2: Let us show that there exists a set Ω 1 ∈ F with P [
For t ∈ R \ Q, a moment's reflection reveals that (5.7) is satisfied for all ω ∈ Ω. Now let t ∈ Q. One has P -almost surely,
where the last inequality uses (5.6). On the paths where (5.8) holds, follows V t = lim inf s>t,s→t V s by the same reasons as for irrational points. This implies (5.7).
Step 3: Let us show that V satisfies (i). We start with deterministic stopping times, i.e., t, s ∈ R, 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T and τ ≡ s. Since the case t = s is trivial, assume that t < s. Using monotone convergence and (5.6), yields for any u ∈ [t, s] ∩ Q that
By the right-continuity of π · ( V t ), this leads to
We now show that (5.9) extends to stopping times, i.e., π t ( V τ ) ≤ V t also holds for any stopping time τ ∈ T t . We first show that this holds for stopping times with finitely many values in [t, T ]. Let τ be such a stopping time, valued in {t 0 , . . . , t N }, with t = t 0 < t 1 < . . . < t N . Then by translation invariance, one has
Since {τ = t N } = {τ > t N −1 } ∈ F t N −1 , the local property and (5.9) give
Using a backward induction in k = N − 1, N − 2, . . ., we obtain by time-consistency that π t0 ( V τ ) ≤ 1 {τ ≥t0} V t0 , for t 0 = t, i.e., π t ( V τ ) ≤ V t . Now for an arbitrary τ in T t , there exists a sequence (τ n ) n of finitely-valued stopping times τ n decreasing to τ . By (5.7), this implies V τ ≤ lim inf n→∞ V τn . Then, from monotonicity and continuity of π t (·) (note that this holds under the continuity assumption on the filtration, see, Proposition 3.1), we have
This means that V satisfies (i).
Step 4: Let us show that
Indeed, by (5.10), holds
s. for all τ ∈ T t which implies "≥" by timeconsistency and monotonicity of π. On the other hand: by (5.5) and
Step 5: Define τ 13) where the second inequality holds because
in probability as n → ∞. Together with (5.13) and continuity of π 0 (·), this
Since L has no negative jumps, L τ t ≥ lim ε→0 L τ ε t and τ t is an optimal stopping strategy for T t , i.e. π 0 (L τ t ) = π 0 ( V t ).
One has V τ t ≥ L τ t and by
Step 3, π 0 ( V τ t ) ≤ π 0 ( V t ). Thus, P V τ t = L τ t = 1 by the strict monotonicity of π 0 (·). Since L u = V u for some u ∈ [t, τ ) would lead to a contradiction, we conclude
and by the usual conditions inf{u ∈ R | u ≥ t, L u = V u } is a stopping time. Property (i) and the optimality of τ t yield that V coincides with the RHS of (3.6) P -a.s..
Step 6: Putting together, we have shown that V is progressively measurable and satisfies (3.6) and the properties (i) and (ii). Now, we proceed to right-continuity. First, we show that V (itself) is right-continuous a.s. along stopping times. Let τ ∈ T 0 and (τ n ) n∈N ⊂ T 0 with τ n ↓ τ for n ↑ ∞. Let us show that P [ V τn −→ V τ ] = 1. By (5.7), it remains to show that P [lim sup n→∞ V τn ≤ V τ ] = 1. By the continuity of the filtration, every stopping time possesses an announcing sequence. Thus, together with the right-continuity of L and the usual conditions, for every m ∈ N, there exists Let u ∈ Q. One has almost surely on {τ ≤ u ≤ σ m },
where the first inequality uses the fact that for all σ ∈ T u and on {σ m ≥ u} holds
From the definition of V it follows for all δ ∈ (0, δ m ],
On the other hand, the European indifference price is right-continuous so that almost surely,
which implies the assertion.
Step 7: Let V be the P -optional projection of the bounded process V , i.e., V is optional and
s. for all τ ∈ T 0 (see, e.g., Theorem 5.1 of He et al. [15] ). Since V is progressively measurable, V τ is F τ -measurable, and we arrive at V τ = V τ P -a.s. for all τ ∈ T 0 . It follows from a section theorem (see, e.g., Theorem 4.7 in [15] ) that for every t ∈ [0, T ], the first time V hits L after time t is a stopping time. Then clearly V , V and L coincide a.s. at the minimum of this stopping time and τ t from Step 5. This implies the a.s. equality of the two stopping times. Since the optional process V is a.s. right-continuous along stopping times, it follows again by a section theorem that it is right-continuous up to evanescence. With the usual conditions, one can choose V to be right-continuous everywhere. Uniqueness is obvious.
Step 8: Let us show that the optional projections of (5.4) satisfy (iii).
, to which we associate V 1 , V 2 and V 1 , V 2 as above. Let τ ∈ T 0 , s ∈ Q, m ∈ N. By {τ ≥ σ, τ ∈ [s − 1/m, s]} ∈ F s , the local property of π s (·) implies for i ∈ {1, 2}, ). In addition, by part 2. of Lemma 4.2, {τ 2n+1 = τ 2n } = {τ 2n+1 = τ 2n = T }, which implies that
Putting together, one obtains One can write G n = H n + η n , where By (2.10), η n is nonpositive. It is the negative of the hypothetical limiting penalty on the event that for the approximating stopping times, the seller stops before the buyer (hence, has to pay the penalty), whereas the limiting stopping times coincide (i.e., actually no penalty has to be paid in the limit). After correcting for this term, which potentially produces a discontinuity, it is easy to see from (5.18 ) that by the right-continuity of X and Y , H
